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Abstract. We present a probabilistic interpretation of the plausibility of attacks in
abstract argumentation frameworks by extending the epistemic approach to proba-
bilistic argumentation with probabilities on attacks. By doing so we also generalise
the previously proposed attack semantics by Villata et al. to the probabilistic set-
ting and provide a fine-grained assessment of the plausibility of attacks. We also
consider the setting where partial probabilistic information on arguments and/or
attacks is given and missing probabilities have to be derived.
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1. Introduction
The probabilistic approaches to computational models of argumentation combine prob-
abilistic reasoning capabilities and formalisms for dealing with the interaction between
arguments and counterarguments, which is an essential approach to obtain a realistic
model of argumentation [12]. Probabilistic approaches to abstract argumentation can be
divided into two groups: the constellations approach [11,8] and the epistemic approach
[14,10]. The former is concerned with an extrinsic interpretation of probability and the
probabilities on arguments and attacks are used to determine with what likelihood these
components actually appear in the argument graphs. In contrast, the epistemic approach
considers an intrinsic interpretation of probability and defines the probabilities of ar-
guments as degrees of belief. The idea behind the epistemic approach is to allow for a
more fine-grained assessment of the acceptability status of an argument by allowing for
the whole spectrum of real values between 0 (complete rejection of an argument) and 1
(complete acceptance of an argument). This motivation is similar to graded semantics
for abstract argumentation, see e. g., [3,1], but the framework of epistemic argumenta-
tion explicitly focuses on probabilistic interpretations of numbers rather than leaving the
meaning of the values abstract, which results in significantly different semantics.
In this work, we focus on the epistemic approach to probabilistic argumentation and,
in particular, the question of deriving degrees of belief from partially specified informa-
tion [9,10]. We also extend our previous works by considering probabilistic beliefs on
attacks with the intuition that a high belief in an attack makes the attack effective while
low belief in attack means that the attack could almost be ignored. In doing so, we pro-
vide an alternative to the approach presented in [13], which treated the belief we have in
an attack either as a signal whether the attacker should be considered or as a proxy for
the belief in the attacker. However, the work in [13] did not consider how the belief in an
attack can provide continuous modulation to the effect that the source argument of the
conflict may have on the target, and does not handle scenarios such as in Example 1.
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A: Cycling in the
city is dangerous.
B: The city council should not waste
money on building separate cycling lanes.
Figure 1. A simple argumentation framework
Example 1. Consider the framework depicted in Figure 1 and imagine a group of col-
leagues discussing cycling lanes. We observe that arguments A and B are enthymemes,
hence participants may decode and agree with them differently. John strongly agrees with
A because he believes that cars pose serious threats to cyclists. He strongly agrees with
A being a good counterargument for B, and opposes B. Robin, although also strongly
agreeing withA, considers this problem to be more complex and being a combination of
both the threat of being hit by a car and breathing in fumes. Consequently, building cy-
cling lanes addresses only one of Robin’s concerns, and although Robin still considersA
to be a counterargument for B, she is not as adamant as John and only slightly disagrees
with B. Finally, Morgan decodes A as “Cycling in the city is dangerous and therefore
one should not cycle the city”. Consequently,A, although strongly agreed to, is no longer
really perceived as much of a counterargument for B, and Morgan strongly believes that
the city would be wasting money by building lanes. We observe that while all colleagues
agree with A to the same degree, they have divergent opinions on the effect it has on B.
The current paper addresses this issue. Our method is partly based on the work [15]
which defined attack semantics for Dung’s abstract argumentation frameworks and pro-
posed a crisp notion of acceptability of an attack. We investigate some simple rational-
ity postulates for our setting, i. e., properties that describe how the beliefs of arguments
and attacks should be (reasonably) linked to each other in the global view of an abstract
argumentation framework. The central paradigm here is that high belief in an argument
and high belief in an attack originating from that argument, lead to low belief in the ar-
gument pointed to by this attack. In formalising this and other intuitions, we obtain a
notion of justifiable probability functions that give reasonable degrees of beliefs to argu-
ments and attacks. In the next step, we consider the computational question of complet-
ing partial probabilistic beliefs, thus extending [9,10] to our generalized setting. More
precisely, given degrees of beliefs in some arguments and attacks, we ask what reason-
able inferences for the degrees of beliefs in the remaining arguments and attacks can be
made.
In summary, the contributions of this paper are as follows:
1. We develop a notion of reasonable probability assignments by formalising de-
sirable properties through rationality postulates, in particular extending previous
(crisp) attack semantics in a principled way (Section 4).
2. We study the problem of completing incomplete probabilistic information from
an inferential perspective (Section 5).
Furthermore, Sections 2 and 3 recall needed background information, Section 6 discusses
related works, and Section 7 concludes our paper.
2. Preliminaries
Abstract argumentation frameworks do not presuppose any internal structure of an argu-
ment and focus on the interactions between them, particularly in context of attack [5]:
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Definition 1. A (Dung’s) abstract argumentation framework AF is a pair AF= (Arg,→)
where Arg is a set of arguments and→ is an attack relation→⊆ Arg×Arg.
If (A,B) ∈→, we usually simply write A→ B and read it as “argument A attacks
argument B”. For AF = (Arg,→), we use A ∈ AF and (A,B) ∈ AF as shorthands for
A ∈ Arg and (A,B) ∈→, respectively. Note that we only consider finite argumentation
frameworks here, i. e., such that the set Arg is finite. We represent frameworks with
directed graphs, where nodes stand for arguments and edges model the attack relation.
Semantics of abstract argumentation frameworks are often defined in terms of ex-
tensions [5,4,2]. An extension E of an argumentation framework AF= (Arg,→) is a set
of arguments E ⊆ Arg that gives some coherent view on the argumentation underlying a
given AF. Here, we focus only on the four classical semantics of [5], namely grounded,
complete, preferred, and stable semantics. For a set of arguments S ⊆ Arg let S− = {B |
∃A ∈ S : B → A} denote the set of attackers of S and let S+ = {B | ∃A ∈ S : A→ B}
denote the set of attacked arguments of S.
Definition 2. Let AF= (Arg,→) be an argumentation framework. An argumentA∈Arg
is acceptable with respect to a set of arguments F ⊆ Arg iff for every B ∈ Arg with
B →A there is A′ ∈ F with A′→B. A set of arguments E ⊆ Arg is:
1. conflict-free iff there there are no A,B ∈ E with A→B.
2. admissible iff it is conflict-free and every A ∈ E is acceptable w.r.t. E.
3. a complete extension (CO) iff it is admissible and there is no A ∈ Arg \E which
is acceptable w.r.t. E.
4. a grounded extension (GR) iff it is complete and E is minimal w.r.t. ⊆.
5. a preferred extension (PR) iff it is complete and E is maximal w.r.t. ⊆.
6. a stable extension (ST) iff it is complete and E ∪E+ = Arg.
If E is some extension we say that each A is accepted wrt. E. We observe that with
the exception of the grounded semantics, the extensions are not necessarily uniquely de-
termined. Furthermore, a stable extension might not necessarily exist [5]. For the remain-
der of the paper we use σ to denote any semantics of GR, CO, PR, ST.
3. The Epistemic Approach to Probabilistic Argumentation
In this section we briefly recall the standard approach to epistemic argumentation that
only considers beliefs in arguments [7,9,12,14]. The epistemic approach is centered
around the probability distributions over the sets of arguments:
Definition 3. A probability function P on AF is a function P : 2Arg → [0,1] with
∑M∈2Arg P(M) = 1. Let PAF denote the set of all such functions.
From this, we derive the probability of a single argument and interpret it as the
belief that an agent has in it, which can, for example, be seen as the degree to which the
agent believes the premises, the conclusion and that the conclusion follows from these
premises. Formally speaking, the marginal belief in an argument A ∈ AF, denoted as
P(A), is defined via:
P(A) = ∑
A∈M∈2Arg
P(M)
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A3 A4 A5
A6
Figure 2. A simple argumentation framework
A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6
P1 0 1 0 0.5 0.5 0.5
P2 0 1 0 1 0 0.5
P3 0 1 0 0 1 0
Table 1. Probability distributions from Exam-
ple 2.
We say that an agent believes an argument A to some degree when P(A) > 0.5,
disbelieves an argument to some degree when P(A)< 0.5, and neither believes nor dis-
believes an argument when P(A) = 0.5.
The epistemic approach provides a wide range of so–called epistemic postulates,
which represent reasonable properties that can be used to restrict the probability distri-
butions if desired. In the context of this work, we recall three such postulates:
Coherence P is coherent in AF if P(B)≤ 1−P(A) for every A→B ∈ AF.
Optimism P is optimistic in AF if P(A)≥ 1−∑B→AP(B) for all A ∈ AF.
Justifiability P is justifiable in AF if it is both coherent and optimistic in AF.
Coherence states that a high degree of belief in an argument should result in a low de-
gree of belief in any argument attacked by the first argument. Optimism states that if all
attackers of an argument have a low degree of belief the argument should have a high de-
gree of belief. These two properties formalise the basic intuitions behind Dung’s original
approach to abstract argumentation [5] in a probabilistic context.
We denote the collection of all coherent (resp. optimistic, justifiable) probability
distributions with PCAF (resp. POAF, PJAF).
Example 2. Consider the argumentation framework AF in Figure 2. A probability distri-
bution assigning to every argument a probability of 1 would be optimistic, but not coher-
ent. In contrast, a probability distribution assigning to every argument a probability of 0
would be coherent, but not optimistic. Among the justifiable probability distributions of
this framework we can find distributions P1 to P3 shown in Table 1. We can observe that
the provided examples reflect the complete extensions of our graph.
4. Extending the Epistemic Approach
In this section we discuss extending the standard epistemic approach to account for be-
liefs in arguments as well as in attacks. This calls for extended probability functions that
assign degrees of belief to both arguments and attacks. In [13], we have considered pairs
of separate argument and attack distributions rather than a single distribution over both
arguments and relations. Although the postulates we have previously considered can be
easily adapted to both forms, the separate one, due to its structure, may contain less infor-
mation on how arguments and attacks are jointly believed. For example, we cannot ask
for the belief in the set {A,(A,B)}, as we could only consider the sum of probabilities
of A and (A,B) separately and the obtained number can be as high as 2. Hence, in this
paper, we consider the single distribution approach. Let MArg = 2Arg∪(Arg×Arg) denote the
set of all possible sets composed of arguments and pairs of arguments.
M. Thimm, A. Hunter, S. Polberg / Epistemic Attack Semantics
A1 A2 A3
Figure 3. The argumentation framework from Example 3
Definition 4. An extended probability function P on AF is a function P : MArg → [0,1]
with ∑M∈MArg P(M) = 1. Let EPAF denote the set of all such functions.
In the following, we drop the term “extended” when there is no risk of confusion.
Given a probability function P onAF the marginal belief in an argumentA∈AF, denoted
as P(A), is defined similarly as in the standard approach. The marginal belief in an attack
(A,B) ∈ AF, denoted as P(A→B), is defined analogously:
P(A) = ∑
A∈M∈MArg
P(M) P(A→B) = ∑
(A,B)∈M∈MArg
P(M)
Example 3. Consider the argumentation framework AF= (Arg,→) depicted in Figure 3
and define a probability function P1 on AF via
P1({A1,A2,(A3,A1)}) = 0.2 P1({A1,A3,(A2,A3)}) = 0.3
P1({A3,(A3,A2),(A2,A1)}) = 0.4 P1({(A2,A3),(A3,A1)}) = 0.1
and P1(M) = 0 for all remaining M ∈MArg. Then we have
P1(A3→A1) = 0.3 P1(A2→A1) = 0.4 P1(A1) = 0.5 P1(A2) = 0.2
P1(A3→A2) = 0.4 P1(A2→A3) = 0.4 P1(A3) = 0.7
Note that the epistemic probability of an attack may be higher than the probabil-
ities of the arguments involved in that attack (which is in contrast to the constella-
tions approach, see Section 6 for more discussion). For instance, compare P(A2) and
P(A2 →A3) in the example above. The reason for that is that we interpret these prob-
abilities as degrees of beliefs in the validity or strength of the components. For exam-
ple, we may have a rather low degree of belief in an argument such as “camera footage
showed that Jack was at the crime scene at the time of the murder” (because of the low
quality of the camera) and equally low degree of belief in an argument such as “camera
footage showed that Jack was at a public lecture at the time of the murder”. However,
even if we do not acknowledge the validity of these arguments, we may have a strong
belief in both arguments attacking each other.
In order to compare our new approach to the epistemic approach without probabil-
ities on attacks, we will sometimes consider the fragment of our approach with attacks
we are certain of. This allows us to model every probability function in the classical
epistemic argumentation as a fully attack-aware extended probability function.
Definition 5. P ∈ EPAF is fully attack-aware if for all (A,B) ∈ AF, P(A→B) = 1. Let
EP fawAF denote the set of all fully attack-aware probability functions.
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In what follows we will focus on introducing two groups of postulates for the ex-
tended epistemic approach, one reflecting the intuitions behind classical epistemic prop-
erties [14] and one focusing on the successful attack semantics from [15].
4.1. Basic Rationality Postulates
In the following, we investigate our epistemic framework in terms of desirable relation-
ships between the various degrees of belief of the components involved. We do this by
discussing rationality postulates in the spirit of our previous works [14,9,10,13].
In order to distinguish the following properties from their counterparts in the existing
epistemic approaches, we annotate our new proposals with a superscripted †. Three of the
most important properties for the epistemic approach [14] are coherence, optimism, and
justifiability, cf. Section 3. Taking probabilities of attacks into account these properties
can be formalised as follows. Let P ∈ EPAF.
Coherence† P is coherent† in AF if P(B)≤ 1−P(A→B)P(A) for everyA→B ∈ AF.
Optimism† P is optimistic† in AF if P(A)≥ 1−∑B→AP(B→A)P(B) for allA∈ AF.
Justifiability† P is justifiable† in AF if it is both coherent† and optimistic† in AF.
In general, the above properties state how belief in an argument should be bounded given
the beliefs in its attackers and the associated attacks. Unlike in [13], the current approach
considers how belief in an attack can provide continuous modulation to the effect that the
source argument of the conflict may have on the target. In particular, coherence† states
that the probability of argument should be bounded from above by the inverse of the prob-
ability of the attacker, weighted by the probability of the attack. The motivation for this
is as follows. If the attack betweenA and B is not acceptable, i. e., P(A→B) = 0, the re-
quirement trivialises to P(B)≤ 1, meaning thatA has no influence on P(B) through this
attack. On the other hand, if the attack is fully believed, i. e., P(A→B) = 1, the require-
ment becomes P(B)≤ 1−P(A) as in the classical epistemic case. Moreover, for differ-
ent levels of acceptability of the attack, the acceptability of A weighs more or less into
the acceptability of B. The property optimism† takes the probability of attacks similarly
into account when defining a lower bound. A probability function P is justifiable† if it is
both coherent† and optimistic†. Let EPJAF⊆EPAF (resp. EPCAF⊆EPAF, EPOAF⊆EPAF)
be the set of all justifiable† (resp. coherent†, optimistic†) probability functions.
Example 4. We continue Example 3 and consider again the framework in Figure 3 and
the probability function P1 with
P1(A3→A1) = 0.3 P1(A2→A1) = 0.4 P1(A1) = 0.5 P1(A2) = 0.2
P1(A3→A2) = 0.4 P1(A2→A3) = 0.4 P1(A3) = 0.7
We first check whether P1 is coherent†. For that it must hold that
P1(A1)≤ 1−P1(A3→A1)P1(A3) ⇔ 0.5≤ 1−0.3∗0.7
P1(A1)≤ 1−P1(A2→A1)P1(A2) ⇔ 0.5≤ 1−0.4∗0.2
P1(A2)≤ 1−P1(A3→A2)P1(A3) ⇔ 0.2≤ 1−0.4∗0.7
P1(A3)≤ 1−P1(A2→A3)P1(A2) ⇔ 0.7≤ 1−0.4∗0.2
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which is indeed the case. Now we check whether P1 is optimistic†. For that it must hold
(among others) that
P1(A1)≥ 1−P(A3→A1)P1(A3)−P(A2→A1)P1(A2)
⇔ 0.5≥ 1−0.3∗0.7−0.4∗0.2 ⇔ 0.5≤ 1−0.29
which is not the case. This is quite clear from observing that A1 has a roughly medium
degree of belief but is only attacked through two weak attacks. Indeed, if the degree of
belief of A1 would be 0.8 (everything else being the same) the above constraint would
be satisfied while still being coherent†. However, optimism† is still not satisfied as the
corresponding constraints for the argumentsA2 andA3 are violated as well. An example
of a probability function P2 that is both coherent† and optimistic† is given via
P2(A2→A1) = 0.4 P2(A3→A2) = 0.5 P2(A1) = 0.7 P2(A3) = 2/3
P2(A3→A1) = 0.3 P2(A2→A3) = 0.5 P2(A2) = 2/3
A first observation is that the above properties are indeed faithful generalisations of
the analogous properties for the classical epistemic approach [10], i. e., for fully attack-
aware probability functions both versions coincide, respectively. The proof of the fol-
lowing theorem is straightforward and omitted.
Theorem 1. Let P ∈ EPAF and P′ ∈ PAF s.t. for every E ⊆ Arg it holds that P′(E) =
∑X∈MArg,E=X∩Arg P(X).
1. If P ∈ EP fawAF , then P is coherent† iff P′ is coherent
2. If P ∈ EP fawAF , then P is optimistic† iff P′ is optimistic
3. If P′ is coherent then P is coherent†
4. If P is optimistic† then P′ is optimistic
As our extended approach generalizes the classical epistemic approach, we also
obtain several correspondences to classical abstract argumentation generalising those
from the literature [14,12]. For E ⊆ Arg and P ∈ PAF we say that E and P are con-
gruent, denoted E ∼ P, if for all A ∈ Arg, A ∈ E implies P(A) = 1, A ∈ E+ implies
P(A) = 0, and A /∈ E ∪E+ implies P(A) = 0.5. Let H(P) be the entropy of P, i. e.,
H(P) =−∑M∈MArg P(M) logP(M). The following then straightforwardly generalises re-
sults from [14] and is given without proof.
Theorem 2. Let E ⊆ Arg and P ∈ EP fawAF with E ∼ P.
1. If E is complete then P ∈ EPJAF.
2. E is grounded iff {P}= argmax
Q∈EP fawAF∩EPJAF
H(Q)
3. If E is stable then P ∈ argmin
Q∈EP fawAF∩EPJAF
H(Q)
Before turning to further rationality postulates, we close the discussion on justifiable
probability functions with a brief look on their computational properties. As reasoning
with the epistemic approach comes down to solving constraint satisfaction problems on
the set of probability functions, it is desirable that the set of feasible solutions (here
justifiable probability functions) enjoys some nice topological features. Indeed, in our
setting the following holds.
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Theorem 3. The set EPJAF is non-empty and closed.
Proof. Any function P with P(A → B) = 0 and P(C) = 1 for all A,B,C ∈ Arg is in
EPJAF. As EPJAF is defined using non-strict inequalities it is also closed.
In contrast to the classical epistemic approach the set EPJAF is not necessarily convex
and not even connected.
Example 5. Consider AF= ({A,B},{(A,B)}) and P1, P2 with
• P1(A) = P1(B) = 1 and P1(A→B) = 0,
• P2(A) = P2(A→B) = 1 and P2(B) = 0,
We have P1,P2 ∈ EPJAF but for the convex combination P3 = 0.5∗P1+0.5∗P2—yielding
P3(A) = 1, P3(A→B) = 0.5, P3(B) = 0.5—we have P3 /∈ EPJAF, showing that EPJAF is
not convex. In fact, in this example EPJAF is also not connected.
Not being convex and connected makes reasoning with EPJAF quite complicated for
algorithmic approaches. We will investigate this issue further in future work.
4.2. Epistemic Attack Semantics
We now turn to another, alternative point of view on probabilities of attacks. In [15]
a novel perspective on semantics of abstract argumentation frameworks is introduced
that focuses on the acceptability of attacks rather than the acceptability of arguments. A
particular contribution of that work is a set of rationality postulates that describe how the
acceptance of attacks relates to acceptance of arguments and of other attacks. While [15]
treats this issue in a qualitative manner—i. e. distinguishing attacks into successful and
unsuccessful attacks—we can lift them to the quantitative case as follows. Let P∈ EPAF.
Attacker Dependence P is attacker-dependent in AF if for all A,B,C ∈ AF, if A→ B
and A→ C then P(A→B) = P(A→ C).
Attack Success P is attack-successful in AF if for allA→B ∈ AF, P(A→B)≥ P(A).
Attack Failure P is attack-failing in AF all A,B,C ∈ AF, if A → B and B → C then
P(B → C)≤ 1−P(A).
Attack Defense P is attack-defensive in AF if for all B → C ∈ AF, P(B → C) ≥ 1−
∑A→BP(A)
The above generalizations faithfully extend the corresponding qualitative versions from
[15]. More precisely, if we define P(A→B) = 1 to mean “The attackA→B is success-
ful”, P(A→ B) = 0 to mean “The attack A→ B is unsuccessful”, P(A) = 1 to mean
“Argument A is accepted”, and P(A) = 0 to mean “Argument A is not accepted” then
the constraints of Definition 4 in [15] are special cases of the above constraints.1
Note, however, that imposing the above postulates brings about a slightly different
interpretation of the probability P(A→ B). As outlined before, P(A→ B) is supposed
to represent a degree of belief in the attack A→ B, i. e., whether the two arguments A
and B are conflicting and to what degree. In our general setting, this degree of belief
1Note that we did not translate the constraints Qualified and Success in terms of acceptance from [15] as the
former is tailored towards the specific formalism of that paper and the latter basically combines the four other
properties.
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can be high while still having a high degree of belief in B. Imposing the postulates from
above interprets “acceptability” as “success”. In particular, one central postulate in this
view (which is implicit in [15]) is the following.
Attack Certainty P is attack-certain in AF if for A→B, P(B)≤ 1−P(A→B).
This postulate models the basic intuition behind the approach of [15], i. e., the higher
the degree of belief in an attack the lower the degree of belief in the attacked argument.
This postulate is a special case of coherence† when the attacking argument is fully be-
lieved. However, imposing Attack Certainty also demands that the belief in an argument
is bounded even if the belief in the attacking arguments is low.
Assuming both Attack Success and Attack Certainty implies coherence in the basic
epistemic setting.
Proposition 1. Let P ∈ EPAF and P′ ∈ PAF be s.t. for every E ⊆ Arg, P′(E) =
∑X∈MArg,E=X∩Arg P(X). If P is attack-successful and attack-certain then P
′ is coherent.
Proof. Let A,B ∈ Arg with A→B. Due to Attack Certainty we have
P(B)≤ 1−P(A→B)
and due to Attack Success we have P(A→B)≥ P(A) and therefore
P(B)≤ 1−P(A)
showing that P is coherent.
Assuming Attack Success, Attack Failure and Attack Certainty yields an interesting
relationship between arguments in a path of length 2.
Proposition 2. Let P ∈ EPAF. If P satisfies Attack Success, Attack Failure and Attack
Certainty then for all A,B,C ∈ AF with A→B and B → C
P(B)≤ 1−max{P(A),P(C)}
Proof. Let A,B,C ∈ Arg with A→B and B → C. Due to Attack Failure we have
P(B → C)≤ 1−P(A)
and due to Attack Certainty we have
P(C)≤ 1−P(B → C)⇔ P(B → C)≤ 1−P(C)
and together
P(B → C)≤min{1−P(A),1−P(C)}⇔ P(B → C)≤ 1−max{P(A),P(C)}
and due to P(B→C)≥P(B) (Attack Success) finally P(B)≤ 1−max{P(A),P(C)}.
So strong belief in either an attacker of B or an argument attacked by B yields low
belief on B itself, independent of the beliefs in the attacks.
As we can see, the epistemic approach allows for different points of view on how
probabilities of attacks can be interpreted and it depends on the application scenario as
to which rationality postulates should be adopted.
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Figure 4. The argumentation framework from Example 6
5. Partial Probability Assignments
We now consider the issue of probabilistic reasoning within our framework, i. e., the
challenge of deriving probabilities of all arguments and attacks given partial probabilistic
information, cf. [9].
Definition 6. A partial probability assignment β on AF= (Arg,→) is a partial function
β : Arg∪ (Arg×Arg)→ [0,1].
Let dom β ⊆ Arg∪ (Arg×Arg) be the domain of β . A partial probability assign-
ment β provides probabilistic constraints on the subset dom β of the components of an
argumentation framework AF= (Arg,→). The question then is how can the probabilities
of the remaining components be derived by taking the topology of the argumentation
framework and rationality postulates into account?
Example 6. We adapt an example from [9] and interpret probabilities of attacks as in
Section 4.1. John is either innocent (I) or guilty (G) to have committed the murder of
Frank. Footage from a surveillance camera at the crime scene (S1) shows that someone
looking like John was present at the time of the crime, giving a reason that John is not
innocent. However, footage from another surveillance camera far away from the crime
scene (S2) gives evidence that a person looking like John was not present at the time
of the crime, giving a reason that John is not guilty. This scenario can be modeled with
the argumentation framework depicted in Figure 4. Now the footage from the camera
S1 is examined by a lab which assesses that the probability of the person in the pictures
is indeed John is 0.7. Moreover, we know that John has a twin brother so the conflict
between arguments S1 and S2 is uncertain, i. e., only assessed to a degree of belief of 0.6
(both directions). However, we are certain of the validity of the remaining attacks. So
given β (S1) = 0.7, β (S1→S2) = 0.6, β (S2→S1) = 0.6, β (S2→G) = β (S1→I) =
β (I → G) = 1 what are now adequate probabilities for the remaining arguments?
A probability function P ∈ EPAF is β -compliant if P(x) = β (x) for all x ∈ dom β .
Let EPβAF ⊆ EPAF be the set of β -compliant probability functions. Every P ∈ EPβAF is
a completion of a partial β and thus provides complete probabilistic information. Let T
be some set of rationality postulates from the previous section (such as coherence† and
attack success). Then we can define probabilistic inference as follows.
Definition 7. Let AF=(Arg,→) be an abstract argumentation framework and β a partial
probability assignment on AF. Then we write AF,β |∼TC[l,r] iff
1. l = inf{P(C) | P ∈ EPβAF,P satisfies T}
2. r = sup{P(C) | P ∈ EPβAF,P satisfies T}
for all C ∈ Arg∪→.
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In other words, if AF,β |∼TC[l,r] then given the partial probabilistic information of
β the probability of the component C (either an argument or an attack) is constrained
within the interval [l,r] wrt. all probability functions that satisfy the rationality postulates
in T .
Example 7. We continue Example 6 and assume T = {coherence†}, i. e., we are only
considering probability functions that are coherent†. Given β defined via
β (S1→S2) = 0.6 β (S2→S1) = 0.6 β (S1) = 0.7
β (S1→I) = 1 β (S2→G) = 1 β (I → G) = 1
we get
AF,β |∼TS2[0,0.5] AF,β |∼TG[0,0.3] AF,β |∼TI[0,0.5]
For example, the probability that John is innocent lies in the interval [0,0.5].
We leave a deeper analysis of this approach for future work.
6. Related Work
This paper can be seen as orthogonal to the previous work in [13], where the focus was
put on exploring the issue of dependent and independent beliefs in attacks and arguments
associated with them, showing the interrelationships between these two settings and how
they can be used to retrieve the extension–based semantics for abstract argumentation
frameworks. In the proposed postulates, the belief in an attack was more seen as a trigger
that would allow or prevent the attacker to affect the attackee, but did not vary the degree
of this effect. The belief distributions were also always assumed to be complete and the
issue of dealing with partially defined function was not explored. In this paper, we have
addressed these issues through the introduction of the † properties and a study on partial
probability assignments. Additionally, we have provided new postulates concerning the
relations between attacks and arguments involved in them and analyzed it in the context
of the proposals made in [15].
In the constellations approach [7,11,8,6], the probabilities associated with attacks
and arguments are used in order to obtain a probability distribution over the subframe-
works of a given framework2. The uncertainty associated with a subframework is then
seen as the probability of it being the “real” framework of an agent. This modelling
means that the constellation probability of an attack is interpreted as a conditional prob-
ability of the attack being present, given that both the attacker and the attacked argument
are present. Therefore, the unconditioned probability of an attack, i. e., the sum of the
probabilities of all subframeworks where this attack is present, is always less or equal
than the probability of both the attacked argument and the attacker. Due to the fact that
epistemic probabilities are interpreted as degrees of beliefs, not as chances of arguments
or attacks appearing, the marginal probability of an attack can be greater than the ones
of the arguments involved. Although technically speaking a subframework distribution
can be mimicked by an extended probability distribution (i.e. the sets of attacks and ar-
2For a framework AF= (Arg,→), a subframework is a framework (Arg′,→′) s.t. Arg′ ⊆ Arg and→′⊆→
∩(Arg′×Arg′).
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guments where attacks refer to arguments not in the set have to have a probability of 0),
their usage and interpretation is different, which means we can obtain little correlation
between the answers provided by the two approaches [13].
7. Summary
We investigated an extension of the epistemic approach to epistemic argumentation by
considering probabilities on the attacks between arguments. By interpreting this proba-
bility as a degree of belief in the the validity we rephrased previous postulates from the
epistemic approach for the new setting and showed several correspondences. We also
took an alternative point of view by interpreting probabilities as in the attack semantics
of Villata et al. [15], therefore generalising their postulates to the probabilistic setting.
Finally, we considered the inferential question of completing incomplete information.
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